A LOOK AT HEALTH CARE FROM A THIRD PARTY PAYOR PERSPECTIVE

Delivered by William E. Flaherty
at the
CORPORATE HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT SYMPOSIUM

co-Sponsored by:
Harris Corporation
and
Holmes Regional Medical Center Development Council

Melbourne, Florida
February 10, 1984
Transcript prepared by:
Don Lindstrom
Corporate Research Department
November 8, 1984
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INTRODUCTION

I am a little concerned about the organization of my speech because
everyone that has spoken before me has gotten me excited about one
aspect or another of the business.
remarks in the interest of time.

I am going to try to limit my
Some questions came up a little

earlier about a subject I did not intend to cover in a lot of
detail.

I would like you to think of this talk as a smorgasbord to

stimulate questions.

I don't think I will lack for being

controversial, but I would like to be responsive to your questions
and concerns rather than think that I am closing anything out with
my comments.

Let me make some introductory remarks before I get into the slides.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida is a mutual insurance company;
it operates private insurance, contracts with the Federal
government, and also operates HMOs.

It has two operational HMOs and

its business plan for the next four years call for an additional
eight HMOs, three of which are to be operational in 1984.

Just another couple of comments.

To me this is a very special

community because on the one hand it has the state's leader

on the other hand, it has a key center for the services

industrially as well as from the standpoint of risk taking and
innovation.
that the community needs as has been shown by the earlier

The ingredients for

demonstration -- an obviously innovative, risk-taking approach to
the management of that health care center.
successfully managing change seem to be here and that's why I'm so
pleased to be participating.

I've just come off a stint of 15 months as a member of the
Governor's Task Force where I sometimes was treated by those who
We had

The verbiage would suggest success for

favor regulation as being to the right of "Atilla the Hun".
our last meeting yesterday.

I will be happy to get into the details of the

the competitive model, but the reality suggests success for
regulation.

recommendations during the question and answer period, but the
philosphy and the endorsement and the generalities are toward the
marketplace while the real bottom line is toward regulation.

I thought that one wasn't needed

The one chart I refused to put up was the one that goes straight up
which shows health care cost.

We are in

because all of you are dealing with cost centers or profit and loss
statements or some other aspects of the pricing problem.

a critical junct1.J.r.e in ter..rrr-s:/:{)-ff:-7 �t line because there is in

2

Florida a move to db sumething about it which.is evidence to us of

"'

anticipatory price increases that are further hurting the
inflationary problem as people try to improve their margins in
anticipation of State rate regulation.

We think there is a need to

take action in the near term.

One of the thoughts that I want to touch on before getting into the
formal remarks is the notion that insurers are sort of not really
interested; they're passive; they funnel money; they act as
conduits.

I will give you a very brief summary of what I've seen

over a period of years.

This business came out of the depression; it was largely started by
trustees of hospitals who were worried about bankruptcies and it
received tremendous consumer acceptance; the insurance industry
joined them and there was explosive growth.

over the years the

Federal government expanded the hospital system through its various
funding techniques.

By the middle sixties, prior to Medicare and

with the exception of the Medicare population, there was
overwhelmingly available coverage; ninety or so percent of the
public was covered.

Since the middle sixties, there has been a steady expansion in the
scope of benefits into a variety of areas such as dental.
efforts to restrict cost contained a silent assumption that
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Early

hospitals were well-intentioned, efficient; and basically under the
control of the industrial leadership of their communities.
Therefore, early cost-containment efforts were focused upon
questions like:

can I audit your books?

have a measure of reasonable charges?

(Blue cross Plan) or Do I

(which is the peer group

comparison for a traditional insurance plan).

These went on and on.

Look at some of the Northeastern and

Midwestern Blue Cross Plans; their contracts with hospitals put
limits on pension costs, on interest costs, on operating margins, on
expansion programs -- generally making them subject to some other
community voluntary agency for review and approval for purposes of
expansion.

Physicians started with fee schedules.

some in many states agreed

not to balance bill for any additional amount.
equity among specialties came into play.
broke down.
way.

Then the problem of

Then the fee schedules

Medicare in the steel industry said, "We have a better

We'll pay you your going charge as long as we determine it to

be reasonable. "

Then we entered into a spiral far in excess of what

was expected in the fee area.

Since that time there have been more recent efforts at
negotiations.

As some have been successful in some states, there
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have been negotiations with state government formally or informally
involved.

Since about 1972, and 1975 in particular, when the

wage/price controls were lifted, industry was confronted with the
rising cost problem.

The real focus of attention shifted from

adequate coverage (i. e. , access to coverage, are people covered?) to
what can we do about the cost?

Of course, I'm not mentioning the

tremendous demand that came about because of Medicare during the
same period.

In the early seventies, experiments in prospective reimbursement of
hospitals such as what Medicare has just adopted were put into
place.

Other efforts included expansion of out-of-hospital

benefits.

(Incidentally, as an insurer this has always come back to

bite me with larger cost.
there are many. )

It's one of those false hopes of which

second opinions, pre-admission testings, pre

admission certification, length-of-stay certification, tight medical
necessity provisions, highly sophisticated computer systems, and
various other techniques have all been used and generally at the
margin do some good.

one of the very profound studies that has been done on expanded
services has to do with nervous and mental conditions and the
treatment of those on an out-of-hospital basis.

Massachusetts

passed a law saying that if you paid a psychiatrist, you have to pay
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a psychologist.

so we have a little study that says if you want to

raise psychologist's income to those of psychaitrist's, just pass
that kind of a law.

The only thing that has happened is that the

charges for the psychologist have risen and there has been no
reduction in payments to psychiatrists.

Those kinds of perverse effects all seem to flow out of the basic
notion that these plans were designed to get people to use care;
they were designed to stimulate the development of an industry and
have done that very well.

But they're obviously obsolete.

The other false hope that I want to sort of step on in order to
stimulate some discussion later on is that coinsurance and
deductibles will make things better.

over 95% of what we sell in

the State of Florida has coinsurance and deductibles.

Generally

speaking, once you get the one-year savings for reducing the scope
of benefits, the rate of increase takes right off again.

Another

notion suggests that if employees aren't involved, they're not
careful.

We have a large group of State of Florida employees

(84, 000 peop�e covered).
charges.

On average, the Plan pays 50% of billed

That's made of two parts:

the employer pays a large part

of the cost of the program and the employee generally pays 20% and
anything over the first $100 goes under the coinsurance provision
(he pays the first $100).

l

Also there are numerous fixed dollar
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limits within the plan to limit the liability.

Even with those

limits and the employee paying perhaps half of the total cost of the
premium, the rates of increase of that plan generally match that of
the rest of the population.

This is but one of many examples.

Another one you may not be familiar with is health services for the
elderly.

Medicare pays about 50% of the billed out-of-hospital

services for patients over 65.

Fifty percent is not paid as either

being higher than allowable charges, disallowed because of
administrative or medical necessity reasons, or subject to the
coinsurance and deductible provision that applies in that program.
Notwithstanding that, the most rapid rate of increase and usage is
in the out-of-hospital service area.

so the appeal of the

involvement of the patient seems to be an intuitive one, not
necessarily borne out in the real world in which we operate.

There is an interesting experiment going on by Ford which gets at
another weakness of coinsurance and deductible programs.
like this.

It works

If the patient doesn't pay the doctor the deductible and

coinsurance, then it shows up as a bad debt.

The bad debt shows up

as an increase in the cost of doing business and that becomes a
legitimate basis for raising his price.
for the hospital.

The same thing is also true

Unless you make the assumption that those bad

debts are all being collected, they can have the effect of being a
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"legitimate basis for raising the price of service. "

We see

evidence in some parts of the community where the coinsurance
provisions are simply not billed; there's really a dual-price
structure and the prices are set based upon what the income and
overall experience is.

A couple of other notions are relevant to the introductory
comments.

In addition to efforts at cost containment, there has

been tremendous growth in the area of self-funding administration.
You might be interested to know that self-funding is encouraged by a
lot of insurers whose experience tells them that if they can give up
one to two percent of income and get off the risk in the health
insurance business that's a good business deal for them -- which
says something about whether it's a good business deal for the
business and industry group.

The record interest rate on reserves

that was earned in the late seventies and early eighties was a
definite stimulus, but self-insurance/self-administration is the
single most rapidly growing phenomena in the health insurance field.

Finally, of course, there has been a tremendous increase in the
emphasis on data for analysis, which I consider to be one of the
healthiest things that's going on.

There is one large national

employer (AT&T) who requires an enormous amount of data for every
single claim transaction.

Not for the purpose of adjudicating the
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claim, but rather for the purpose of analyzing and determining what
variations are occurring in the various operating areas.

We think

that this is a problem amenable to business analysis and that much
more of a direct analysis activity has real potential.

During this

period also the insurers have learned that there may be business out
there they can get but they may not want it.
tighten their underwriting.

They have tried to

The industry newsletter recently

carried a lead article saying there's all the small group health
insurance you can sell in the market, but the trick is to do it and
break even and make a little bit of money on it.

This is by way of background.

What I'm trying to say is that the

industry thus far has not really been passive, but obviously has not
been successful.

As I would like to get into a little more detail

on what we see ahead, keep in mind one quote which I'm paying dearly
for having made in a public forum because my salesmen heard it, and
that is:

"traditional health insurance is not sick, it's dead; it

just has not been buried. "

I had to explain that to my salesmen and

I'm having some fun.

Slide 1
Alternative Approaches to cost containment:
Third Party Payor Perspective
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I would like to briefly get into some public policy questions and
some statistics.

I'll try not to belabor you with statistics you've

probably already seen.

I'll focus a little on the insurance

industry and then on some alternatives.

Slide 2
Approaches for Containing Health care costs:
Market Reform vs. Direct Economic Regulation.

First of all we think that the key is competition vs. economic
regulation.

But we think it's not competition as the world has

been, it's market reform -- without which competition works poorly.

Slide 3
What is Health care
1.
2.
3.

A Monopoly?
A competitive Industry?
A Developing Competitive Industry?

What is health care?

If it's a monopoly it ought to be regulated.

If it's a competitive industry there's a chance for marketplace
discipline to occur.

Perhaps its a developing competitive industry

that needs to move either into category one or two above.
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Slide 4

If _you look at standard economic analysis of those industries where
regulation could be favored versus those where incentives could be
favored, you can see under regulation a lot of the simplifications
that staff to legislative committees like to make.

Unless you can

make those assumptions you will fail in regulations -- such as good
information on cost and quantities, definition of products, and
clear objectives, and so on.

The right-hand side of this slide

describes more of what's really involved in this industry.
fundamental inadequacy, the fourth line down:
to price changes.
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With one

high responsiveness

At the transaction of delivering care that is not the case; that is
why market reform is essential.

The multiplicity and the subtle

nature of many of the objectives makes it very difficult for
judgments to be made.

If any of you read the Wall Street Journal

article of a few months back on the British National Health system
and decision making, it's very clear that money is allocated
according to the political process (i. e. , according to which
community has the most politicial influence).

And if you have not

dealt in the state government and know that the state agency staff
depend upon friendly legislators for their appropriations and other
things, then the idea that there's some logical, rational decision
making that goes on in state government is really a threat to good
decision making for us because we may assume something will happen
that won't happen.

Slide 5
Position of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida:
1. Desire a sound, not lavish, health care
system in Florida.
2. Need to facilitate innovation and
experimentation in delivery and financing of
care.
3. Change must occur in current adversarial
relationship as regulatory agencies come
under increasing pressure to solve health
care costs problem.
we try to advocate a sound, but not lavish, health care system.

We

need to facilitate innovation and experimentation in the delivery
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and financing of care.
take risk.

By facilitate I mean also the ability to

Change must occur in the current adversarial

relationship as regulatory agencies come under increasing pressure
to solve health care cost problems.

We need more cooperative,

mutually supportive relations between the public and private sector,
a genuine desire to reform the marketplace and the desire to deal
with the "disease" rather than the symptoms.

If I have a fear, it

is that the hospital industry will decide that the changes necessary
for competition are too wrenching and, therefore, find regulation
preferable.

Slide 6
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

Seek more cooperative, mutually supportive
relations between public and private sector.
Assuming a genuine desire to reform market
place, to deal with •disease, • rather than
symptoms, regulatory agencies should promote
informed buying by consumers and facilitate
meeting consumer need by insurers, coalitions
and others.
Seek deregulation, but not before
restructuring of market to establish sound
market conditions.
Market reform is consistent with fundamental
beliefs of our society.
Placing greatest possible reliance on
decentralized decision making is especially
pertinent in health care, due to political
obstacles to efficient governmental planning
and regulation.

seek deregulation specifically regarding certificate of need, but
not before restructuring the market to establish sound market
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conditions.

The planning agency in Jacksonville is confronted with

announced statements that there will be four HMOs operating in
Jacksonville.

They suddenly have a problem.

The problem is the

formula they have been using to decide how many hospitals beds are
needed is more hospital beds than we will need.

The agency was only

set up to keep hospitals from building beds, not to figure out what
to do when we have a surplus of beds and we won't need any more for
years to come.

Market reform is consistent with the fundamental

beliefs of our society; the notion of decentralized decision making
is especially pertinent in health care.

There really is no ability

for a person working in an analytical role in Tallahassee to
understand the differences between Melbourne and other communities
and their needs for appropriate services.

We need to reinforce

recent actions at the national and state level to create a market
conducive to market reform proposals.

Slide 7
9.

Reinforce recent actions at national and
state level to create a market conducive to
market reform proposals:
A. Federal government - D. R. G. 's - hospitals
now have burden of controlling own costs.
B. Private and public negotiations with
individual hospitals over price. - PPO's,
HMO's etc.
10. Purchase of indigent care by state, based on
price and efficiency.
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The Federal government has moved this way with their DRGs.

I might

add, if you haven't heard about Miami and the Medicare experiment,
DRGs are mild compared to what's going on in Miami.
like the old west.

It's kind of

There is a competitive model experiment going on

and they say the reason is they want to find out all the good and
the bad of competition.

There are a number of operators down there

and HMOs who are promising the world and the public is flocking to
them in tens of thousands.
quality care?

Now the question is:

Will they give

Will they give it with reasonable waiting periods?

Will they deal financially in a responsible way?
some will and some won't.

our quess is that

If because some don't the whole idea is

thrown out instead of establishing conditions for success, we will
have lost an important opportunity -- private and public
negotiations with individual hospitals over price and use.

Most of

the systems today really are talking about price and use combined.

Finally, purchase of indigent care by the state based on price and
efficiency.

Another way of saying it is "competitively bid. "

so,

if I were to try and summarize what we see as the necessary steps,
those would be the key questions and what we think some of the key
issues are.
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Slide 8

I would like to briefly go into a few statistics to highlight some
features that may not be immediately available to you.

This study

was contracted out by the Health Care Financing Administration to
break out health care inflation into its component parts:

what was

due to population, what was due to general inflation, what was due
to health specific inflation, and the greater volume and
sophiscation of services.

I would like to dramatize the last part

of that.

A few years ago there was a publication put out by the American
Hospital Association that looked at the number of x-rays ordered per
patient day in teaching hospitals.

It actually was finer than that,

teaching hospitals with 300 or more beds.

The results showed that

the number of x-rays per patient day was increasing at an annual
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rate of 15% per year (i. e. , volume of services per patient day).

so

as the technology changes, there are usage factors in there and
given the complexity of the product, it's really very, very hard to
nail down.

This is the most definitive study that we're aware of on

the subject.

Slide 9
NATIONAL HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES BY CATEGORY - 1981
($ billion)

%

$

Category

55

19

118

41

Nursing Home

24

8

Drugs

21

7

37

14

32

11

Physicians
Hospital

Other_ Personal Health (dentists, eyeglasses,
home health)
Other Health Expenditures

$287

Total

100%

Source: Florida Hospital Cost Containment Board (1983)

This slide shows the expenditures by category.

The hospital

industry is getting the focus of attention for several reasons:
it's the largest single number; it's the most heavily insured
number; and politically it's the group that you can get your hands
on.

We in the insurance business don't see health care cost

increases the way they are recorded to the public.
recorded to
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The way they're

the public typically is in terms of the price increase.

The

Jacksonville General Hospital raised its chart structure by 12% this
year.

The true cost

which shows up in the claims that are paid

by the employer and the insurance plan

is the compound effect of

price and use.

Slide 10

This slide shows that an 11% and a 10% increase produce a 22%
increase in payouts.

That's the number that determines employee

benefit costs, insurance plan costs, and premium increases.

That's

the number the consumer is confronted with -- which is why there is
so much popular support for rate regulation among the general
public.

The compound effect of these numbers is turning out to be

staggering.

so the core is to get at both price and use, certainly

not just one of them.
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Now, let's talk about how the rates have increased and have effected
the health insurance industry.

First of all, in Florida there are

600 companies earning group premiums, four firms have market shares
exceeding 5%, 19 have market shares exceeding 1%, top 10 firms
accounts for 59%; the top 50 firms account for 85%.

That is about

as close as you can come to a textbook example to pure competition.
There is not much any of us can do to dominate the market.
a very different situation than in the Northern states.

This is

We have

about 15% of the market and we would guess that Aetna -- because
they do so much ASO work which is not reported as premiums -
probably is around 12 or 13%.
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Slide 12

The industry as a whole, from its health insurance activities has
successively lost (taking the commercial insurers as a group) 1. 4 to
2. 3 billion dollars.

The Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans have lost

approximately half a billion dollars over each of the last three
years.

There was some improvement in 1983, but not significant

improvement.

Basically, health insurance is a losing business.

Interest income on the money involved in current business does not
begin to offset those losses.

You might be interested in some

hometown numbers.
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Slide 13

This slide shows the average rate of increase that our customers
would have had to have pay if they continued to take the same
benefits in the next year as they had in the last year.

Every time

you give someone a rate increase you may induce some bargaining and
negotiation that results in a contract change.

If you want to see something instructive, though, look at 1981.

In

1980 we converted all of our small accounts to deductible and
coinsurance as a cost-saving technique.

What happened was that our

income tended to level off and then we had an explosive increase in
cost.

In 1981 we had a $15, 000, 000 loss from underwriting

operations.
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Slide 1 4

O. K.

The make-up o f this rate assuming it is a group of say 100

employees or so.

Claims would account for about 90%, the

administrative cost would account for 7-1/2%, and the risk and
contingency factor assuming it was fully insured would account for
about 2-1/2%.

That would be what we would assume to be the case as

we set the rate.

In fact, we have not been able to obtain the

2-1/2% due to price competition in the industry.
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Slide 15

One of the problems we are faced with is the long time periods over
which we make a financial guarantee.

We begin in one time period

(shown on the left hand side of the chart) to accumulate
experience.

At about the end of the twelve months, we have a set of

data which then must be seasoned for three more months.

so that at

the end of 15 months we have data which we consider useful for
analysis for setting the next year's rate.

We then enter into about

a 30 day period of analysis and rate making and then 60 days with
the customer going back and forth.
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(He may wish to change the plan

Finally, at point T2 a rate

or the way it operates in some way. )

goes into effect which is generally guaranteed for 12 more months
and for which claims do not come in until 15 months.

so that 30

months later we look at decisions that were made based upon
assumptions gained in our previous business and then adapted through
that 30 month period.

Now, depending upon when renewal periods are,

that can change slightly.

But there is a fair degree of hazard.

·If

you look at the reserves of any insurer (except the largest) in
terms of how many years in a row they could miss their estimate by
5%, it generally is not a lot of years or there wouldn't be an
insurer around.

Slide 16

HEALTH PLAN FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS

Self-insured, self-administered

7
1975

Self-insured, outside administered
Insured, incl. Blue Cross/Blue Shield
Combination (insured/self-insured)
Number of survey responses

6%
83%
4%
443

Category

I

\

%

1978
1 13%

11%

1979

1980

23%
61%
6%
445

22%
61%
5%
546

10%

20%
64%
5%
390

12%

1 34%

Source: Markus, 1981

Now as I mentioned earlier, self-insurance has been stimulated by
both inflation and interest rates as well as other concerns.
is national data from the Library of Congress.

The percent of

self-insured went from 13% in 1975 to 34% in 1980.
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This

And there are numbers to indicate that its well over 50% in
Florida.

Of the 22 firms in the south FJorida Coalition, 21 are

self-insured.

Slid� l'l

A recent south Florida coalition survey of employers indicated that
a total of 36 and 15 were either self-insured or partially
self-insured, but that was not all of the employers.

It was a large

sector, but not all of them.

What can you conclude from this and my earlier sort of brief
recitation of cost containment efforts?
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Slide 18
conclusion
o

The current products of the industry reflect primarily the
goal of public policy which was access to care.

o

The goal has now shifted from •unlimited access• to
•efficiency. •

o

Choices for insurers:
A.

Invest in redesigning products that ensure cost
effective delivery of health care.

B.

Reduce benefits significantly in the traditional product
(and try and stay below your trend lines).

c.

Drop out of health insurance.

We see all of these being done.

Equitable being the best example of

number c, having dropped out of writing groups of 100 lives or less
which is traditionally where you're fully insured.

And Prudential

being an example of putting a heavy emphasis on A with a tremendous
emphasis they're putting on the Prucare program to get their HMOs
operational.

Of course, they took the worst loss of any single

company in any single year two years ago.

one point I'd like to make here about public policy.
very important points about public policy.
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A couple of

There is unbelievable

support by the working public for
benefits.

health insurance and broad

I dealt with the auto industry for 15 years.

And you

could get a strike faster by talking about adding a two dollar
deductible than you could by taking a lot of money off the table.
That was the real world of how they viewed things and their value
system.

I think there are three reasons for that that are not always
remembered.

First of all, during the Korean war and to some degree

before then there were wage controls, but there was no limit on
benefit controls.

It really taught people that benefit dollars were

valuable dollars.

secondly, you have a tax policy that says every

dollar in benefits you get is equal to $1.20 in salary.
been lost on the public.

That hasn't

Thirdly, the tremendous flow of dollars

has brought about for many people -- not necessarily in Florida, but
for many people -- a reassurance that the provider of care will take
the insurance payment and that user will not have a residual
obligation.

However, it worked out that you will not have one.

The

combination of those three factors means that there's little or no
popular support for cutting those benefits.

I don't believe that

Medicare will cut its basic benefit plan in the face of the current
cost pressure, not unless there is a restructuring of the financing
and delivery system itself.

so this basic notion of obsolescence is

really the crucial issue.
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Slide �-'1

The famous cost shift.

A cost shift is considered to have occurred

in the hospital industry, not when someone fails to pay cost, but
when someone fails to pay the price that management has determined
on average should be paid.

That automatically assumes that the

margin is reasonable and appropriate.

There's a long history behind

that concept, going back to when hospitals were essentially
community service agencies.

The AHA worked with a lot of other

folks to develop what was called the principles of financial
requirements.

They tried to define the economics necessary to

survive and maintain plant and equipment, maintain currency with
technology, and serve the community.
accounting costs.
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That number is more than just

some margin is definitely needed for the business as a whole.

on

the other hand, as a member of the Hospital Cost Containment Board,
I know of profit and non-profit hospitals who publicly say that an
operating margin of 15% or more is appropriate.

Now how many

businesses do we have in America that are guaranteed 15% on sales?
The first sound assumption is that the charges have been set to
produce the right total amount of revenue.

The second observation relates to Medicare.
Medicare history.

Here's a little

Prior to Medicare in 1965, the Blue cross Plans

in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Michigan and a few other states,
working with community industry leaders, had set limits on what they
would pay hospitals for care.

The purpose was to encourage

efficiency in order to guarantee hospital survival.
very general limits.

I used the examples earlier of pension,

interest, and a few others.
pay hospitals.

But they were

Medicare was faced with deciding how to

Their staff discovered what Blue cross was doing and

they baked it into a formula.

If a Blue cross Plan would not pay

for a certain interest or other cost, it generally would pay 2%
above what hospital costs were calculated to be.

The intent was to

allow hospitals to meet their working capital requirement and to
fund needed expansion because the historical price level
depreciation may not have been adequate in those days of 1, 2, or 3%
inflation.
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Medicare used that guideline to begin with; it also used a factor
for the greater intensity of the over 65.

As time went on and

Medicare got into budgetary trouble, those guidelines were
eliminated.

Thus, what may have started off being a good idea is

not practiced today.

There is no attempt to recognize the economic

cost to the hosptial for serving the aged.

In some cases the

Medicare payment may be covering it, in other cases they may not
be.

The result is interesting.

If the number of people under

Medicare in the right hand box is greater than the number of people
that are in the Private Pay category, then given Medicare's payment
and the hospital's need for the same amount of dollars, the private
payors will pay more.

We could get to the ultimate contradication

where 95% of the patients were Medicare and they only pay, say $10
less a day than they need to pay, but the hospital has to get that
$10 per patient day from the remaining 5% of the patients.
Therefore, the hospital may charge the private pay patients $100 a
day more than is needed.

The key question in all of this is:
first place?
Jacksonville:

What is appropriate in the

Let me describe the situation that's developed in
Jacksonville is overbedded with more than four beds

per thousand, and it's a young population group.

If these HMOs are

operational, the Jacksonville market may need only three beds per
thousand.

Should all those hospitals have plans for capital
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accumulation for future plant and equipment expansion for a greater
number of beds?
beds?

or should they be looking at reducing the number of

The problem arises because there is no price discipline

forcing hospitals to make judgments based upon the market place.

It

is an extremely complicated issue.

Slide 20

This slide shows some numbers that are currently available on the
average gross revenues for hospitals in Florida for the three years
1970, 1980, and 1981: 271, 313, 374.

That's what hospitals would

have generated if everybody paid charges.
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Medicare does not, many

others do not.

The gross revenue that would have been required if
217, 247,

everyone paid full charges is shown the next line down:
and 293.

The resultant mark-up over and above the average cost that

covers the margin that the hospital claims is needed is in the order
of $54, $66, and $81 a day.

It is paid by private industry, Blue

Cross, Aetna, etc.

There is a problem, but it varies from community to community and
from hospital to hospital.

Because of the way the Medicare program

is funded, there is little likelihood that the problem will be
corrected by Medicare agreeing to pay more.

Slide 21
Effective and fair price mechanism felt by
providers and consumers does not exist.
a.

Consumers (physicians and patients) haven't
been directly movtivated by price or
efficiency of providers due to impact of
traditional third party payments

b.

Payers haven't been able to negotiate with
providers because they haven't been the ones
to choose providers and didn't influence
their choice.

We feel that effective and fair price mechanisms do not exist as
they should to affect provider and consumer behavior.

Consumers

have not been directly motivated by price or efficiency of providers
due to the impact of traditional third-party payments.
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Regardless

of the deductible and coinsurance, if I go to a high-charging
physician or an inefficient hospital, I have the same personal
obligation.

In most communities in Florida, there is a 100% range

from low to high within specialties for the same service in the
charges of physicians.

so regardless of what you tinker with in the

way of deductibles and coinsurance, you don't get at problem A.
Payers haven't been able to negotiate with providers because they
haven't been the ones to choose the providers and didn't influence
their choice.

Slide 22
c.

Providers have had no incentive as to price
or efficiency because consumers were not
impacted.

d.

Providers are not in equal position to
compete because of disproportionate
distribution of societal costs.

Providers have not had an incentive as to price or efficiency
because consumers were not affected.

can you imagine the provider

who reduces his investment for amenities and has a competitor who
expands his amenities when the insurance plan pays all but $100 for
each program?

Providers are not in an equal position to compete

because of dispropriate distribution of societal costs.

We have

hosptials today in Florida who could reduce their costs to the
private payor by $100 a day if they were paid an appropriate amount
under Medicaid.
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CONCLUSIONS
How can you ask the hospital that is serving the community with a
large number of indigents to compete on the basis of price without
equalizing the load?

These are some of the fundamental barriers to

the competitive system working.

Slide 23
Approaches to Achieve Effective and Fair Price
Competition
1. Allow payers to negotiate on behalf of
insureds.
a. Insureds agree to use only panel
providers (HMO).
b. Insureds receive some economic benefit
for using panel providers (PPO).
c. As a result of a. and b. , providers have
new incentive for cost efficiencies.

The conclusion would suggest that approaches which achieve effective
and fair price competition are needed.
behalf of the insureds.

Allow payors to negotiate on

There are three ways that can be done.

Insureds agree to use only a panel of providers which is a
traditional HMO in one form or another, insureds receive some
economic benefit for using panel providers (PPO).

The program we're

about to launch in Miami will say to the insured, if you go to one
of the more efficient providers, we will pay 80% of your cost after
$100 deductible.

If you go to another provider in the community, we

will pay 65% of your cost and $100 deductible.

It's taken a while

for the market to accept that kind of a contract.
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Basically, what

had to happen is the same thing that happened to the price of
gasoline.

Once the price got to a certain level, people were

willing to drive the Toyota.

But as long as it was below a certain

level, we hung onto the larger car, the old way of doing things.
There is something to be given up and that's choice.

The PPO

offers, whether it's a permanent or temporary phenomenon, the chance
of wide choice and the consumer receives a direct benefit if it's a
prudent choice.

As a result of (a) and (b) above, providers have new incentives for
cost efficiencies.

we know of hospital administrations that are

profiling their physician community, talking with and counselling
the physicians who have a history of ordering a large number of
services -- disproportionate from their peer group for the same
service, for the same diagnosis.

In a cold, crass way that

physician used to be an opportunity; he's now a liability.

It's

become a problem for the institution and now they will manage it.
If the hospital operated more efficiently under the previous
Medicare system or the previous insurance plan, it just meant they
got paid less.
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Slide 24
2.

Equalize ability of providers to compete by
equalizing societal costs.
a.
b.

In long term, increase government funding
and efficiency of purchasing,
In short term, equalize by efficiency of
purchasing, sharing of burden and other
means.

We must equalize the ablity of providers to compete by equalizing
societal costs.

In the long term, increase government funding and

efficiency of purchasing.
Medicaid.

The first part of that has to do with

Florida is 48th or 49th out of the 50 states in funding

its Medicaid Program.

It has come out of a very limited tradition

in that regard and it will not change this year to any significant
degree.

The legislators are telling us that Proposition 1 is such a

threat that they are not going to tolerate any possible tax at this
time.

Working within the constraint of currently available funds,

you then get to (b) which is to equalize the burden among hospitals
by using a method of assessing hospitals a portion of what they have
been providing for indigent care; then giving it back to the
hospitals along with Federal matching monies for taking care of the
indigents, but based upon negotiated prices.

In effect, we will

take money out of the system, bring federal dollars in, match the
two together and then use it to buy care on a competitive bid basis
or some form of competitive bid.

Those are essentially what I would

call the market reform characteristics.

Others would include

educating people and getting information out to coalitions, etc.

l
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Slide 25
Assessing the Florida Environment
o
o
o
o
o
0

Population concentration in metropolitan
areas.
Growth of coalitions.
Prevalence of cost sharing in Florida.
over supply of physicians.
oversupply of beds in some areas.
Growth in HMOS and PPOs.

How would it play in Florida?
metropolitan areas.

The population is concentrated in

That's important for the prospect of competition,

because an area that is only served by one group of physicians or one
facility may take the approach of saying I don't want to play.
coalitions - that's an informed buyer.
coalition serves a wonderful role.

Growth of

For example, the south Florida

They took their claims data, matched

it against the Hospital Cost Containment Board's published data on the
cost of certain kinds of treatment in hospitals in Florida, and they
found no relationship.
data.

They were dealing in reality; it was their claims

Because the Hospital Cost Containment Board is an agency of state

government, it has to do everything by rule.

The HCCB made a sound

assumption that whichever hospital you went to you got the same number of
services, the same length of stay, etc.

They created a hypothetical that

does not exist and then said to the public use that to compare -- which
is really counter-productive, although its not deliberate.
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Florida is a state that already has well established cost-sharing as
the standard in the employee community.

You have to set your

benefits and wages to be competitive in the labor market in which
you compete.

For a leading organization such as the Harris

Corporation that's a national labor market, but at least for a large
number of employers, it's a local labor market.

Therefore, the wide

prevalence of cost-sharing in Florida sets a good stage for the kind
of changes we think are needed.

There is a rapidly increasing supply of physicians and an oversupply
of beds.

Therefore, people are worried about patients.

we are

talking about the old fashioned business of cutting price in order
to maintain market share.

Finally, there is already a strong

indication of the growth of HMOs and PPOs.

Slide 26
Access to Hospitals
o
o

87. 9% of Floridians live in metropolitan
areas (SMSA's)
80% of Florida hospitals are in metropolitan
areas

source:

1980 u. s. Census, FHA Fact Book

Just touching on some of these points, 88% of Floridians live in
metropolitan areas, 80% of the hospitals are located in metropolitan
areas, about 80% of the population has access to two or more
hospitals within convenient driving distance.
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FL ORIDA
HMOs
September 1 983

■

Operati o nal
• D evelop mental
o Feas i b i lity

This slide illustrates HMOs that are operational, formally in
development, or where feasibility studies are underway.

Incidently,

the big money players are getting into HMOs both through venture
capital activity and through the large insurance companies.
think this is an idea whose time has come for Florida.
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We

Slide 2 8

FLORIDA HMO ENROLLMENT
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Here is the historical growth and forecasted growth in HMO
enrollment.

If you look at the numbers they don't look very big

until you look at the annual rates of change:
80' - 46% over, and so on.
will be a significant force.

83' - 42% growth over 82.

What they do is make price

Therefore, they stimulate other people's

innovation in changing the way they do things.
benefit.

We think this

Don't assume that HMOs will

necessarily dominate the marketplace.
competition legitimate.

79' over 78' - 107%,

Therein lies the

I doubt that the 1990 form of organization for serving the

community is known; I don't think it's going to be what we are
selling today or planning to sell next year.
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This slide shows nationwide preimum increases for individual
coverage.

Between 1980 and 1982 there was a 29% increase for HMOs

and a 49% increase for insurance plans.
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The national utilization average for all Blue cross/Blue Shield
plans is 700.

Florida was higher than that, partly because of the

higher average age under 65 -- we have a lot of 50-55 year old
people.

HMOs nationally were at 458 (that is days per thousand per

year), federally qualified HMOs were at 4 39.

our HMO in Tallahassee

-- which tends to have a younger enrollment population -- is running
about 350 days per thousand.
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Slide 3 1

Florida physician manpower is important for both HMO and PPO
development.

We're being approached by physicians from all over

Florida who are proposing new ways of doing business.

In 1970 there

were 1. 2 per 1, 000; in 1982 there were 2. 07 per 1, 000.

We see young

physicians coming into the community very happy to join HMOs and
PPOs; established physicians are coming to us and saying they w9uld
like to be involved in these programs.

That's important because

their cooperation is a make or break issue.
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Slide 3 2

Here is an initial result of a PPO in Denver; its initial because
they're very new.

In comparison to the NON-PPO 5. 4 vs. 5. 9 days,

$5 32 cost per day vs $635.

Incidently, in South Florida we have

over 500 physicians who are board certified and board eligible that
have signed up for a program in which their fee schedule is slightly
more than 50% of what we consider to be the upper limit -- which a
lot of other people are charging.
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SUMMARYLRECOMMENDATIONS:

Slide 33
1.
2.
3.

Be fully aware of your company situation.
Be knowledgeable about the health care
industry in your area.
Help stimulate development of competitive
health care markets by:
o
Promoting development of alternative
delivery systems (HMOs and PPOs).
Offering alternative delivery programs to
o
your employees.
o
Implementing cost containment measures in
your benefit design.

For employers be aware of your company situation, get involved in
statistical financial analysis.
in your area.

Be knowledgeable about the industry

Help stimulate the development of competitive health

care markets by promoting their development, by offering alternative
programs to your employees, and by implementing cost containment
measures in your benefit design (and evaluating them).

Slide 34
4.
5.
6.

Encourage health lifestyles among your
employees and sponsor supportive programs.
Participate in and reorient health planning
and regulation.
Develop coalitions and engage the support of
other businesses in achieving coaliton
ob jectives.

Encourage healthy lifestyles, participate in and reorient health
planning and regulation.
they get started.

These things have a life of their own once

Develop coalitions and engage in the support of

other businesses in achieving coalition objectives.
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Slide 35
Blue cross and Blue Shield recommends a flexible,
incremental, approach to market reform, emphasizing
leadership, rather than legislation, including the
following:
1. Endorse a market reform strategy.
2. Challenge the private sector to get involved.
3. Authorize supportive measures. Get the government
to authorize supportive measures (taking long
periods of time for intense scrutiny on contracts
that are totally experimental because they may
violate some aspects of the insurance code or some
other part of the law is counterproductive) .
4. Selectively deregulate the health care and
insurance industries.
5. Review and redefine the role of the Health care
Cost Containment Board. (The average hospital who
got other than a cursory review by staff had
something problematic about their budget. At the
end of five years of operation, the Board is
reviewing those hospitals five months after the
year starts. That is not atypical. We cannot
always assume that the government operates
smoothly. )

Slide 36
6.
7.
8.

waive mandated benefits for the competitive models.
Improve the Medicaid Program.
Equitably distribute the burden of indigent care
to allow price competition.
9. Protect and encourage PPO development (HMO already
has that via Federal law ) .
10. Establish a commission to conduct comprehensive
research.
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We are one of the largest states in the Union.

We really don't have

a significant graduate program of education and resultant research
on health care economics and statistics that would give us a work
product.

As a member of the Governor's Task Force, I sat for

countless months listening to experts from Baltimore, New Yoik City,
Connecticut come in and tell me what Florida was like on the
assumption it was like the rest of the world.

It was simultaneously

tragic and hilarious because we have very little factual information
about health care and health care economics in Florida.
constitute the recommendations that we have.

Those

I appreciate your time

very much and will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
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